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Abstract 
The  theory  of  natural  selection  cannot  describe  how  early  life 
evolved, in part because acquired characteristics are passed on 
through horizontal exchange. It has been proposed that culture, 
like life, began with the emergence of autopoietic form, thus its 
evolution  too  cannot  be  described  by  natural  selection.  The 
evolution of autopoietic form can be described using a framework 
referred to as Context-driven Actualization of Potential (CAP), 
which grew out of a generalization of the formalisms of quantum 
mechanics,  and  encompasses  nondeterministic  as  well  as 
deterministic  change  of  state.  The  autopoietic  structure  that 
evolves  through  culture  is  the  mind,  or  more  accurately  the 
conceptual network that yields an individual’s internal model of 
the  world.  A  branch of  CAP  research  referred  to  as  the  state-
context-property  (SCOP)  formalism  provides  a  mathematical 
framework  for  reconciling  the  stability  of  conceptual  structure 
with its susceptibility to context-driven change. The combination 
of  two  or  more  concepts  (an  extreme  case  of  contextual 
influence),  as  occurs  in  insight,  is  modeled  as  a  state  of 
entanglement.  Theoretical  and  empirical  findings  are  presented 
that challenge assumptions underlying virtually all of cognitive 
science,  such  as  the  notion  of  spreading  activation  and  the 
assumption  that  cognitive  processes  can  be  described  with  a 
Kolmogorovian probability model.  
Introduction 
In what sense can ideas be said to evolve? That is, in what 
sense  does  the  concept  of  evolution  apply  to  human 
culture?  That  is  the  question  that  I  began  my  research 
trying to answer. I was led to the conclusion that in order 
to  understand  how  culture  evolves  one  must  understand 
creativity,  the  process  by  which  cultural  novelty  born. 
From there I reached the conclusion that at the heart of the 
creative  process  is  a  new  way  of  conceptualizing 
something.  Thus  to  understand  creativity,  one  must 
understand what concepts are, and how they influence one 
another  when they act as contexts  for one another.  And 
from there I reached the most surprising conclusion of all: 
to  understand  how  concepts  interact  requires  formalisms 
originally developed for quantum  mechanics. This paper 
summarizes  this  intellectual  journey,  with  its  recurring 
theme that knowledge obtained in one of these interrelated 
domains constrains what constitutes a promising research 
direction in other domains.  
Evolution Does Not Begin with Natural 
Selection 
It is generally assumed that to prove that culture constitutes 
a  genuine  evolutionary  process  one  must  prove  that  it 
evolves  through  natural  selection  (e.g.  Fracchia  and 
Lewontin  1999).  This  follows  naturally  from  the 
assumption that there is just one process by which entities 
evolve:  natural  selection.  Indeed  theories  about  how 
culture evolves generally assume that cultural evolution is 
Darwinian (e.g. Aunger 2000; Cziko 1997, 1998; Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman 1981; Durham 1991; Mesoudi et al., 
2004,  2006).  But  natural  selection  does  not  take  us  far 
toward an explanation of the emergence of new forms with 
new  dynamics,  nor  can  it  account  for  the  origin  of  life 
itself.  
Examining  the  earliest  stages  in  the  evolution  of 
biological life can constrain the development of a realistic 
theory of  how cultural evolution began. Present day life 
replicates  using  a  template,  a  coded  set  of  instructions 
encoded in DNA or RNA for how to make a copy of itself. 
The probability of such a structure arising spontaneously is 
exceedingly small;  Hoyle infamously compared it to the 
probability  that  a  tornado  blowing  through  a  junkyard 
would  assemble  a  Boeing  747  (Hoyle  1981).  The 
implausibility  of  the  spontaneous  appearance  of  a  self-
assembly code has led to the  wide-spread acceptance of 
metabolism  first  theories,  according  to  which  life  began 
with  an  ensemble  of  simple,  collectively  replicating 
molecules
,  such  as  an  autocatalytically  closed
i1set  of 
polymers (Bollobas 2001; Bollobas and Rasmussen 1989; 
Dyson  1982,  1985;  Kauffman  1993;  Morowitz  1992; 
Wäechtershäeuser 1992; Weber 1998, 2000; Williams and 
Frausto da Silva 1999, 2002, 2003). Self-replication is not 
all-at-once  using  a  self-assembly  code,  but  piecemeal. 
Although no one  molecule replicates itself, the  whole is 
regenerated through the interactions and transformations of 
its  parts.  The  ensemble  can  therefore  be  said  to  be 
autopoietic  (Maturana  and  Varela  1980).  Genetically 
mediated template replication emerged subsequently from 
the  dynamics  of  these  molecular  systems  (Gabora  2006; 
Kauffman 1993; Vetsigian, Woese, and Goldenfeld 2006; 
                                                 
1 Closure is used in the mathematical sense, not in the sense that 
nothing can get in or out. Depew  and  Weber  1996).  Thus  we  have  (at  least)  two 
means by which entities evolve. The one that came later, 
and  with  which  we  are  more  familiar,  is  the  highly 
constrained process of natural selection, which makes use 
of a self-assembly code (i.e. the genetic code). The one that 
preceded it, and which has only recently been recognized 
as a viable means by which to evolve, is a more haphazard 
process  involving  autopoiesis.  Given  that  life  itself  has 
exhibited over the course of history two different forms of 
evolution,  what  basis  is  there  for  assuming  that  culture 
evolves through a process more akin to that of present day 
life than that of early life? Does not Hoyle’s 747 argument 
apply also to culture?  
What  necessitated  the  theory  of  natural  selection,  a 
rather intricate theory of population-level change, is that 
acquired traits are not inherited from parent to offspring at 
the individual level in biological lineages. If a cat bites off 
a rat’s tail, it is not the case that the rat’s offspring are tail-
less.  What  then  does  it  take  for  change  to  stick  around 
generation  after  generation?  That  was  the  paradox  that 
Darwin faced, and the paradox for which natural selection 
provided a solution. But there is no such paradox for early 
life,  nor  for  culture.  The  periodic  ‘backtracking’  to  a 
previous state when one member of a lineages gives birth 
to  another  arises  because  they  are  von  Neumann  self-
replicating automata. Self-replicating automata use a self-
assembly code that is both actively transcribed to produce 
a new individual, and passively copied to ensure that the 
new  individual  can  itself  reproduce.  The  new  individual 
may change, but the passively copied code within does not. 
But cultural traits do not possess such a code, and are not 
self-replicating  automata.  Indeed  in  culture,  as  in  all 
domains  other  than  biology,  explanation  of  change  is 
straightforward.  When  an  entity  undergoes  a  change  of 
state, say from p(0) to p(1), the change is retained. One 
could say it is ‘inherited’ by the future states of the entity, 
p(2), p(3) and so forth. The entity does not spontaneously 
revert  back  to  p(0).  For  example,  if  a  billiard  ball  gets 
dented, it generally stays dented. Cultural theorists wish to 
apply  natural  selection  to  culture  on  the  grounds  that 
culture  exhibits  phenomena  observed  in  biology  such  as 
adaptation, inheritance, and drift. But it was not adaptation, 
inheritance, drift, and so  forth, that  fueled the theory of 
natural  selection.  It  was  that  these  phenomena  occur 
despite the loss of acquired characteristics; i.e. despite (one 
could say) the malfunctioning of the normal mechanism of 
change.  Thus  if  culture  exhibits  adaptation,  inheritance, 
and drift, it does not follow that it does so because it is 
Darwinian. A more parsimonious explanation is that these 
phenomena  arise  not  just  through  natural  selection 
occurring  at  the  population  level,  but  also  through 
processes occurring at the level of the individual or artifact 
where  change  is  straightforwardly  retained.  Thus  the 
rationale for arguing that culture is Darwinian is faulty. It 
is hypothesized that life and culture both began with the 
emergence of autopoietic form, and this is no coincidence 
but reflects constraints on what it takes to bootstrap an 
evolutionary process. 
Evolution through Context-driven 
Actualization of Potential (CAP) 
For  natural  selection  to  be  applicable  to  a  process  there 
must  be  no  inheritance  of  acquired  characteristics  (or  at 
least  it  must  be  negligible  compared  to  change  due  to 
differential  replication  of  individuals  with  heritable 
variation  competing  for  scarce  resources).  Since 
autopoietic  form  does  not  use  a  self-assembly  code  to 
replicate, acquired characteristics are not obliterated each 
generation but passed on through horizontal
2 (Lamarckian) 
exchange.  Thus  its  evolution  cannot  be  described  by 
natural  selection  as  mathematically  formulated  by 
population  geneticists  (Gabora  2004,  2006;  Vetsigian, 
Woese, and Goldenfeld 2006). Furthermore, to the extent 
that the horizontal exchange involves interaction with an 
incompletely  specified  context,  thus  nondeterminism,  it 
entails  a  non-Kolmogorovian  probability  model  (Gabora 
2006)  and  cannot  be  described  by,  not  just  natural 
selection,  but  any  mathematics  that  assumes  a 
Kolmogorovian  probability  model  (Pitowsky  1989).  If 
natural selection is inapplicable when, as is the case for 
early  life  and  culture,  replication  occurs  without  a  self-
assembly code, what theory can describe the evolutionary 
process entailed?  
This  is  the  question  that  prompted  the  attempt  to 
formulate a cross-disciplinary framework for contextually 
mediated  change  of  state  referred  to  as  Context-driven 
Actualization  of  Potential,  or  CAP  (Gabora  and  Aerts 
2005).  What  unites  physical,  chemical,  biological, 
psychological,  and  cultural  processes  in  CAP  is  the 
actualization  of  potential  form  through  re-iterated 
interaction  with  a  context.  These  processes  differ  with 
respect  to  the  degree  to  which  they  (i)  depend  upon  a 
particular internal or external environment or context, (ii) 
internalize context, (iii) are sensitive to context, and most 
importantly (iv) exhibit non-determinism. Since we do not 
always have perfect knowledge of the state of the entity, 
the context, and the interaction between them, a general 
description of an evolutionary process must be able to cope 
with nondeterminism.  
Processes  differ  with  respect  to  the  degree  of 
determinism involved in the changes of state that the entity 
undergoes.  Consider  an  entity—whether  it  be  physical, 
biological, mental, or some other sort—in a state p(ti) at an 
instant of time ti. If it is under the influence of a context 
e(ti), and we know with certainty that p(ti) changes to state 
p(ti+1)  at  time  ti+1,  we  refer  to  the  change  of  state  as 
deterministic.  Newtonian  physics  provides  the  classic 
example  of  deterministic  change  of  state.  Knowing  the 
                                                 
2  This  stands  in  contrast  to  the  vertical  (parent  to  offspring) 
transmission in modern day organisms. speed and position of a ball, one can predict its speed and 
position  at  some  time  in  the  future.  In  many  situations, 
however,  an  entity  in  a  state  p(ti)  at  time  ti  under  the 
influence of a context e(ti) may change to any state in the 
set {p1(ti+1), p2(ti+1), …, pn(ti+1), … }. When more than one 
change of state is possible, the process is nondeterministic.  
Nondeterministic  change  can  be  divided  into  two 
kinds. In the first, the nondeterminism originates from a 
lack of knowledge concerning the state of the entity p(ti) 
itself.  This  means  that  deep  down  the  change  is 
deterministic,  but  since  we  lack  knowledge  about  what 
happens at this deeper level, and since we want to make a 
model  of  what  we  know,  the  model  we  make  is 
nondeterministic. This kind of nondeterminism is modeled 
by  a  stochastic  theory  that  makes  use  of  a  probability 
structure that satisfies Kolmogorov’s axioms.  
  Another possibility is that the nondeterminism arises 
through lack of knowledge concerning the context e(ti), or 
how  that  context  interacts  with  the  entity.
3  It  has  been 
proven that in this case the stochastic model to describe 
this  situation  necessitates  a  non-Kolmogorovian 
probability  model.  A  Kolmogorovian  probability  model 
(such  as  is  used  in  population  genetics)  cannot  be  used 
(Aerts 1986; Accardi and Fedullo 1982; Pitowsky, 1989; 
Randall and Foulis 1976). It is only possible to ignore the 
problem of incomplete knowledge of context if all contexts 
are equally likely, or if context has a temporary or limited 
effect. Because the entity  has the potential to change  to 
many different states (given the various possible states the 
context could be in, since we lack precise knowledge of it), 
we  say  that  it  is  in  a  potentiality  state  with  respect  to 
context.  
Note that a potentiality state is not  predetermined, just 
waiting for its time to come along, at least not insofar as 
our  models  can  discern,  possibly  because  we  cannot 
precisely  specify  the  context  that  will  come  along  and 
actualize it. Note also that a state is only a potentiality state 
in relation to a certain (incompletely specified) context. It 
is possible for a state to be a potentiality state with respect 
to  one  context,  and  a  deterministic  state  with  respect  to 
another. More precisely, a state that is deterministic with 
respect to a context can be considered a limit case of a 
potentiality state, with zero potentiality. 
In reality the universe is so complex that we can never 
describe with complete certainty and accuracy the context 
to which an entity is exposed, and how it interacts with the 
entity.  There  is  always  some  possibility  of  even  very 
unlikely outcomes. However, there are situations in which 
                                                 
3 Another possibility is that the nondeterminism is ontological i.e. 
the  universe  is  at  bottom  intrinsically  nondeterministic.  In  this 
case the mathematical structure needed to model the situation is 
equivalent  to  that  needed  to  model  the  situation  where  the 
nondeterminism arises through lack of knowledge of the context 
(Aerts 1994). This means that ontological indeterminism is also 
described by the CAP framework. 
we  can  predict  the  values  of  relevant  variables  with 
sufficient accuracy that we may consider the entity to be in 
a  particular  state,  and  other  situations  in  which  there  is 
enough  uncertainty  to  necessitate  the  concept  of 
potentiality. Thus a formalism for describing the evolution 
of  these  entities  must  take  into  account  the  degree  of 
knowledge we as observers have about the context. 
We have seen that a description of the evolutionary 
trajectory of an entity may involve nondeterminism with 
respect to the state of the entity, the context, or how they 
interact. An important step toward the development of a 
complete theory of change of state incorporating biological 
and cultural evolution is to find a mathematical structure 
that can incorporate all these possibilities.
4 There exists an 
elaborate  mathematical  framework  for  describing  the 
change and actualization of potentiality through contextual 
interaction  that  was  developed  for  quantum  mechanics. 
However it has several limitations, including the linearity 
of the Hilbert space, and the fact that one can only describe 
the  extreme  case  where  change  of  state  is  maximally 
contextual.  Other  mathematical theories lift the quantum 
formalism out of its specific structural limitations, making 
it possible to describe nondeterministic effects of context 
in other domains (Aerts 1993; Aerts and Durt 1994; Foulis 
and Randall 1981; Foulis, Piron, and Randall 1983; Jauch 
1968;  Mackey  1963;  Piron  1976,  1989,  1990;  Pitowsky 
1989;  Randall  and  Foulis  1976,  1978).  The  algebraic 
structure  of  the  state  space  may  be  given  by  the  set  of 
atoms of a complete lattice (they play the role of the rays 
of  a  complex  Hilbert  space  in  quantum  mechanics). 
Measurements are described by Boolean morphisms on the 
lattice (they play the role of the self-adjoint operators in 
quantum  mechanics).  The  original  motivation  for  these 
generalized formalisms was theoretical (as opposed to the 
need to describe the reality revealed by experiments). With 
these formalisms it is possible to describe situations with 
any degree of contextuality. In fact, classical and quantum 
come  out  as  special  cases:  quantum  at  one  extreme  of 
complete contextuality, and classical at the other extreme, 
complete lack of contextuality (Piron 1976; Aerts 1983).  
This is why it lends itself to the description of context-
driven  evolution.  For  example,  let  us  say  an  entity 
undergoes a change of state from to p0(t0) to p1(t1). The 
change of state of the entity  may evoke a change in its 
context  (or  in  the  sort  of  context  it  is  subsequently 
                                                 
4 This story has a precedent. The same problem arose in physics 
in the last century. Classical mechanics could describe situations 
where  the  effect  of  the  measurement  was  negligible,  but  not 
situations  where  the  measurement  intrinsically  influenced  the 
evolution of an entity. This is because it does not provide a way 
of coping with contextuality (except in the initial conditions or in 
an  ad  hoc  way,  by  introducing  an  additional  model  of 
perturbation).  Modern  classical  theories,  such  as  chaos  and 
complexity,  though  they  provide  a  means  of  transcending 
reductionism, still have this limitation. susceptible  to),  or  the  context  may  change  of  its  own 
accord. Under the influence of this (possibly new) context, 
which we call e(t1),  there may be many potential states it 
could change to. We denote this set of states {p1(t2), p2(t2), 
…, pn(t2), … }. At time t2, one of these states, for example 
p3(t2), may actualize. And so forth, recursively. The states 
p(t0), p(t1), p(t2), …, p(ti), … constitute the trajectory of the 
entity  through  state  space,  and  describe  its  evolution  in 
time.  Thus,  the  general  evolution  process  is  broadly 
construed  as  the  incremental  change  that  results  from 
recursive,  context-driven  change.  A  model  of  an 
evolutionary  process  may  consist  of  both  deterministic 
segments,  where  the  entity  changes  state  in  a  way  that 
follows  predictably  given  its  previous  state  and/or  the 
context  to  which  it  is  exposed,  and/or  nondeterministic 
segments, where this is not the case. 
Having examined a non-Darwinian means by which an 
entity  can  accumulate  change  we  now  hypothesize  that 
culture,  like  early  life,  evolves  not  through  natural 
selection,  but  through  a  reiterated  process  of  context-
driven  actualization  of  potential  (or  CAP)  in  which 
interaction with a context changes not just the state of an 
entity but its potentiality for further change. 
The Unit of Replication 
In  biological  evolution  the  unit  of  replication  is  the 
organism. It replicates to produce another individual and 
its  lineage  thereby  continues  even  after  it  is  deceased. 
Because  of  mutation  and  sexual  recombination  this 
replication  event  introduces  variation  into  the  lineage; 
offspring are not identical to parent. Thus self-replication 
does not merely perpetuate the lineage; it is necessary for 
the  open-ended  accumulation  of  adaptive  biological 
novelty. 
If culture evolves then what is the unit of replication? 
Theories of cultural evolution generally start with isolated 
units of cultural information such as stories or artifacts as 
the basic evolving entity (Aunger 2000; Cziko 1997, 1998; 
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Durham 1991; Mesoudi 
et al., 2004, 2006). But it was shown that such units of 
cultural information are not self-replicating (Gabora 2004). 
I  propose  that  the  unit  of  self-replication  in  cultural 
evolution is the mind, or more accurately the conceptual 
network  that  yields  an  internal  model  of  the  world,  or 
worldview (Gabora 1998, 2000). In this approach, stories 
and artifacts are merely observables; the entity evolving is 
the  conceptual  network  that  gives  rise  to  them.  A 
worldview  is  conceptually  closed  when  for  any  item  in 
memory there exists a way of reinterpreting or redescribing 
it in terms of others (e.g. X is like Y except for Z). Just as 
polymers catalyze reactions that generate other polymers, 
retrieval of one item evokes retrieval of another. As the 
diversity  of  items  in  memory  increases,  the  number  of 
associative paths increases even faster, and graph theory 
tells us that the probability they organize into a connected 
closure space increases  sharply (Cohen 1988; Erdös and 
Rényi 1960). At this point there exists a potential chain of 
associations from any one item encoded in memory to any 
other.  The  capacity  of  a  conceptual  network  to  capture 
meaningful  regularity  in  the  world  is  facilitated  by  the 
disposition  to  group  related  items  into  concepts,  which 
themselves form hierarchies, bestowing the network with 
the  sparse  connectivity,  short  average  path  lengths,  and 
strong  local  clustering  characteristic  of  small  world 
structure  (Watts  and  Strogatz  1998).  With  sparse 
connectivity,  associations  are  strong  enough  that  one 
thought  can  lead  to  another,  but  weak  enough  that 
everything does not remind one of everything else. Thus a 
worldview  emerges,  the  structure  of  which  corresponds 
somewhat  to  that  of  individuals  (e.g.  parents)  who 
kickstarted the process by sharing knowledge and attitudes. 
As in metabolism-first origin of life theories, the integrity 
of  this  communal  entity  is  continually  challenged  and 
stimulated  by  horizontally  transmitted  inputs.  It  is  self-
mending  and  self-maintaining  to  the  extent  that  it  is 
inclined  to  resolve  any  threat  this  imposes  to  its 
continuation  as  an  integrated  whole.  It  replicates  to  the 
extent that it in turn passes its views to others. The child 
can now go well beyond cued retrieval of fixed responses 
because  he/she  has  an  integrated  conceptual  structure  at 
his/her disposal to interpret and generate cultural novelty, 
tailoring responses to the specifics of situations. The more 
fine-grained the  memory, the  more features encoded per 
item, and thus more routes for associative recall. Thus the 
above hypothesis is elaborated: cumulative culture arose 
when human memory became sufficiently fine-grained to 
be predisposed to achieve conceptual closure.  
The Ephemeral Nature of Conceptual 
Structure 
It would appear that the structure of a conceptual network 
inheres in its hierarchies of  concepts and their relations. 
However,  empirical  work  on  concepts  shows  that  they 
have  neither  defining  attributes  nor  definite  boundaries, 
and exhibit gradients of membership (Rosch 1973, 1978). 
A concept does not represent something in the world in a 
predefined  manner.  The  applicability  of  properties  of  a 
concept,  as  well  as  the  typicality  of  exemplars,  shift 
depending  on  the  frame  or  context  in  which  it  arises 
(Barsalou  1982).  For  example  under  the  context 
‘Christmas’,  a  typical  exemplar  of  TREE  is  FIR  and  a 
typical property is ‘needles’, but not so under the context 
‘desert island’. Other studies show that a word’s implicitly 
activated  associative  structure  is  clearly  linked  to  and 
dependent upon context (Nelson, Goodmon, and Ceo, in 
press). 
The ease with which concepts shift under the influence 
of  context  implies  that  the  pattern  of  connectivity  of  a conceptual  network  is  transient,  and  therefore  that 
conceptual closure is not a once-and-for-all affair. Thus it 
is  hypothesized  that  one  does  not  establish  closure  just 
once but re-establishes it with respect to each change-of-
context  one  encounters.  This  is  postulated  to  be  the 
mechanism by which culture accumulates and conceptual 
networks evolve. Each interaction with a context actualizes 
some aspect of what was previously immediately potential 
for  it,  and  this  interaction  changes  what  is  now 
immediately potential for it. 
The  view  that  change  to  a  conceptual  network 
modifies its potentiality for further change is incompatible 
with the pervasive notion that thought functions as a search 
algorithm. Proponents of the constraint satisfaction theory 
of  concept  combination,  for  example,  claim  that  one 
“performs  a  constrained  search  of  the  space  of  possible 
interpretations”  and  “selects”  predicates  (Costello  and 
Keane 2001). Elsewhere it is explicitly stated that thought 
is Darwinian (Calvin 1996a, b; Calvin and Bickerton 2000; 
Campbell  1965,  Simonton  1998a,  b).  But  in  algorithmic 
search the relevant variables are defined in advance, thus 
the  search  space  is  generally  fixed.  Creative  problem 
solving, however, proceeds through honing; each thought 
affects  how  one  will  proceed  from  there.  It  effectively 
alters  the  problem  space,  sometimes  imperceptibly, 
sometimes dramatically (Boden 1993; Gabora 2005). This 
alteration of the problem space is reflected in that creative 
ideas  often  combine  concepts  such  that  the  combination 
exhibits  emergent  properties  not  in  either  of  the 
constituents (e.g. ‘spout’ for the concept combination TEA 
POT)  or  loss  of  typical  properties  (e.g.  ‘surrounded  by 
water’  for  ISLAND  in  the  combination  KITCHEN 
ISLAND).  Moreover,  studies  of  the  creative  process 
suggest that one often knows one has found an idea prior to 
being able to express it (Feinstein 2005), suggesting that 
during creative thought ideas need not yet be in a form in 
which they could compete or get selected amongst or be 
manipulated  as  semantic  primitives.  Thus  another 
hypothesis is that when conceptual closure is disrupted it 
can be re-established through contemplation, which does 
not occur through search but through honing. 
The SCOP Theory of Concepts 
A  first  step  toward  understanding  how  a  conceptual 
network  evolves  and  how  ideas  are  honed  is  to  break 
thought down into transitions from one cognitive state to 
another, and model how context affects this transition. This 
is accomplished using an application of CAP to concepts 
referred to as the State-COntext-Property theory or SCOP 
(Gabora and Aerts 2002a,b; Aerts and Gabora 2005a,b). A 
similar  approach  is  being  used  by  others  to  model 
contextual  effects  on  word  meanings  (Bruza  and  Cole 
2005;  Widdows  2003;  Widdows  and  Peters  2003).  Like 
geometrical  (Gardenfors  2000)  and  dual  theory 
(Wisniewski  1997)  approaches  to  concepts,  the  SCOP 
approach  is  concerned  with  conceptual  structure,  but  in 
SCOP the structure of a concept (or combination of them) 
is probabilistic and influenced by context. Two concepts 
can be said to be ‘connected’ to the extent that they are 
likely to act as contexts for one another and thereby evoke 
one another in some form.  
A SCOP model of a concept consists of a set of states, 
each  of  which  is  elicited  by  a  context.  Each  context-
specific  state  is  associated  with  unique  sets  of  weighted 
properties,  exemplar  typicalities,  and  transition 
probabilities,  the  last  of  which  give  the  likelihood  that, 
under a given context, it will undergo a change of state. If a 
state of a concept is not affected by a particular context it is 
said to be an eigenstate for this context. Otherwise it is a 
potentiality  (superposition-like)  state  for  this  context, 
reflecting  its  susceptibility  to  change.  When  one  is  not 
thinking of a concept it is in its ground state. A concept is 
always evoked in some context; one never experiences it in 
its  raw  or  undisturbed  ground  state.  In  the  ground  state 
typical  properties  (e.g.  ‘surrounded  by  water’  for  the 
concept ISLAND) have a weight close to 1, while atypical 
properties (e.g. ‘square’ for ISLAND) have a weight close 
to 0. From the ground state it is possible to transition to 
any other state under the influence of some context, and 
this  new  state  has  differently  weighted  properties.  For 
example, applying the context KITCHEN transforms the 
ground  state  of  ISLAND  to  a  state  where  weight  or 
applicability of ‘surrounded by water’ is (hopefully) low. 
The structure of a SCOP is derived by determining the 
natural relations for sets of states, contexts, and properties. 
If context e is more constrained than context f (e.g. ‘in the 
big box’ is more constrained than ‘in the box’) we say e ‘is 
stronger than or equal to’ f, thereby introducing a partial 
order  relation  in  the  set  of  contexts  M.  By  introducing 
‘and’ and ‘or’ contexts, M obtains the structure of a lattice. 
By  introducing  the  ‘not’  context,  an  orthocomplemented 
lattice is derived for M. The same is done for the set of 
properties L, making it possible to construct a topological 
representation of a SCOP in a closure space. 
To  obtain  not  just  qualitative  but  numerical  results, 
and to model the combination of concepts, the SCOP is 
embedded  in  a  less  abstract,  more  constrained 
mathematical structure, complex Hilbert space. A state is 
described  by  a  unit  vector  or  a  density  operator,  and  a 
context  or  property  by  an  orthogonal  projection.  The 
formalism  determines  the  formulas  that  describe  the 
transition probabilities between states, and the formulas for 
calculating the weights of properties, allowing us to predict 
typicality of exemplars and applicability of properties. The 
typicalities of exemplars and applicabilities of properties 
yielded by the calculation matched those obtained in the 
experiments with human subjects. For example, given a list of  questions  such  as  (a)  Given  context  C1,  ‘The  pet  is 
being taught to talk’, rate the applicability of the property 
‘furry’,  or  (b)  Given  context  C2,  ‘The  pet  is  chewing  a 
bone’, rate the typicality of the exemplar ‘dog’. Note that 
we test the prediction that the applicability of each single 
property varies for each context, as does the typicality of 
each exemplar, by an amount that can be calculated from 
the structure of states and contexts.  
Conceptual Entanglement 
The  SCOP  formalism  is  able  to  model  combinations  of 
concepts as entangled states by taking the tensor product of 
the Hilbert spaces of the concept and the context (which 
may itself be another concept or conglomeration of them). 
This yields a new state space with states that may exhibit a 
gain or loss of properties compared to its constituents. The 
tensor product procedure generates two kinds of vectors: 
(1) product states, for which a change of context can affect 
one component of the combination and not the other, and 
(2)  non-product  states,  for  which  a  change  of  context 
cannot affect one component without affecting the other. 
Non-product states are the states of entanglement.  
The definitive test for entanglement (and nonlocality; 
thus for nonclassical logical structure) is the violation of 
Bell’s inequalities (Bell 1964). To prove that entanglement 
is present one performs four experiments, each with two 
possible outcomes, which can be performed together (two 
experiments at the same time) as coincidence experiments. 
The outcomes are plugged into Bell’s inequalities to see 
whether they are violated. A procedure for demonstrating 
the violation of Bell’s inequalities in cognition has been 
published  (Aerts  et  al.  2000).  The  experiments  entail 
asking  a  subject  to  think  about  a  particular  concept  and 
observing  how  the  subject  responds  to  simultaneous 
manipulations  (coincidence  experiments)  that  cause  the 
subject to think of one of two instances of that concept. 
Plugging the results into Bell’s equations demonstrates in 
theory  at  least  entanglement  amongst  instances  of  a 
concept. Experimental support for the notion that concepts, 
their combinations, and the relationships between various 
instances of a concept or a group of related concept can be 
accurately described as entanglement comes from findings 
that  an  ‘action  at  a  distance’  hypothesis  (synchronous 
activation of a word’s associates) supported the results of 
cued  recall  experiments  better  than  the  ‘spreading 
activation’  hypothesis  (Nelson,  McEvoy,  and  Pointer 
2003). 
Significance and Future Work 
There  is  currently  no  broadly  accepted  answer  to  the 
question of how culture evolves (or even whether another 
form  of  evolution,  other  than  biological  evolution,  is 
possible).  The  theory  put  forth  here  is  that  culture  is  a 
genuine form of evolution, with the mind the unit of self-
replication,  and  it  evolves,  as  did  early  life  prior  to  the 
emergence of the genetic code, through a non-Darwinian 
process  involving  reiterated  actualization  of  potential 
through interaction with a context. 
Psychological  experiments  as  well  as  mathematical 
and computer models are being used to generate findings 
that  support,  refute,  or  refine  the  hypothesis  that 
autopoietic, conceptually closed structure emerges in the 
mind,  evolves  through  context-driven  actualization  of 
potential  (CAP),  and  requires  formalisms  from  quantum 
mechanics for its description. Further work is to be done 
on  the  application  of  quantum  formalisms  to  creative 
thought, specifically to how cognitive states described as 
states of entanglement are disambiguated through honing. 
The  modeling  of  concept  combination  using  formalisms 
originally developed to model entangled quantum systems 
holds  promise  as  a  model  of  insight.  Theoretical  and 
empirical  work  is  converging  toward  support  a  new 
framework  for  understanding  what  is  arguably  the  most 
uniquely human characteristic: the capacity to invent, and 
the propensity to put our own spin on others’ inventions 
such that novelty accumulates. If the research supports the 
existence of entangled states and structure that necessitates 
a non-Kolmogorovian probability model in cognition, then 
this will amount to demonstrating that the vast majority of 
models  in  cognitive  science  (e.g.  neural  /  Bayesian 
networks) use a mathematics that a priori cannot capture a 
class of cognitive states. 
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